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STANDARD OIL AND U.S. STEEL: 
PREDATION AND COLLUSION IN THE 
LAW OF MONOPOLIZATION AND 
MERGERS 
WILLIAM H. PAGE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court‘s 1911 decision in Standard Oil1 gave us 
embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the 
Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 12 and the monopoly 
power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2.3 But a case filed later in 
1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation,4 shaped the 
understanding of Standard Oil‘s standards of liability for decades. U.S. 
Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920,5 upheld the 
spectacular 1901 merger that created ―the Corporation,‖ as U.S. Steel was 
known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals 
 
 * Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar and Associate Dean, University of Florida Levin 
College of Law. I thank Herbert Hovenkamp, Barak Orbach, Daniel Sokol, and the participants in the 
―100 Years of Standard Oil‖ conference for their comments. 
 1.  Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 2.  Id. at 66 (In cases alleging a violation of the Sherman Act ―the rule of reason, in the light of 
the principles of law and the public policy which the act embodies, must be applied.‖). 
 3.  Id. at 75–76 (holding that ―the unification of power and control over petroleum and its 
products which was the inevitable result of the combining in the New Jersey corporation by the increase 
of its stock and the transfer to it of the stocks of so many other corporations. . .‖ created a ―prima facie 
presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of 
normal methods of industrial development, but by new means of combination, . . . with the purpose of 
excluding others from the trade. . . .‖). 
 4.  United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
 5.  The district court decided the case in U.S. Steel‘s favor in 1915. United States v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 223 F. 55, 67 (D.N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). President Wilson and Attorney General 
Thomas Gregory, with the consent of Chief Justice Edward White, successfully petitioned the Supreme 
Court to suspend the government‘s appeal during World War I. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, BIG STEEL AND 
THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 181–82 (1969). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873542
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to control prices in the famous Gary dinners had violated Section 1 when 
they occurred, but paradoxically insulated U.S. Steel from liability under 
Section 2.6 U.S. Steel was formed to monopolize the industry, but failed; it 
demonstrated its impotence by fixing prices with rivals instead of crushing 
them, as Standard Oil had done.7 
U.S. Steel‘s interpretation and application of Standard Oil essentially 
ended governmental enforcement of Section 2 until Alcoa.8 Economic 
scholars suggest that the case ratified ―the most socially damaging of all 
mergers in U.S. history‖9 and caused lasting harm to the American 
economy by making its fundamental steel industry less competitive.10 
Equally important, I will argue here, is that the case harmed antitrust 
doctrine. In cases like Alcoa, it played a role in confusing the law of 
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Moreover, by 
rendering Section 1 of the Sherman Act ineffective against monopolistic 
mergers, it contributed to the passage of Cellar-Kefauver Act‘s amendment 
 
 6.  See U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 440 (finding that U.S. Steel‘s ―power was efficient only when in 
co-operation with its competitors, and hence it concerted with them in the expedients of pools, 
associations, trade meetings, and finally in a system of dinners inaugurated in 1907 by the president of 
the company, E. H. Gary, and called ‗the Gary Dinners‘‖). See generally William H. Page, The Gary 
Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597 (2009) (discussing the Gary 
Dinners and their impact on different courts‘ analysis).  
 7.  Id. at 444–45 (―Monopoly, therefore, was not achieved, and competitors had to be persuaded 
by pools, associations, trade meetings, and through the social form of dinners, all of them, it may be, 
violations of the law, but transient in their purpose and effect.‖). 
 8.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Court 
reaffirmed the approach of U.S. Steel in United States v. Int‘l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 702 (1927) 
(holding that a 1918 consent decree had restored competitive conditions and no further relief was 
warranted). For a discussion of U.S. Steel‘s effects on Section 2 enforcement, see William E. Kovacic, 
Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for 
Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1989); Robert W. Harbeson, A New Phase of the 
Antitrust Law, 45 MICH. L. REV. 977, 978–79 (1947).  
 9.  Donald O. Parsons & Edward John Ray, The United States Steel Consolidation: The 
Creation of Market Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 181, 215 (1975).  
 10.  Craig A. Gallet, The Gradual Response of Market Power to Mergers in the U.S. Steel 
Industry, 18 REV. INDUS. ORG. 327, 329 (2001) ( ―Following the creation of the U.S. Steel Corporation 
in 1901, the structure of the U.S. Steel industry has remained that of a tight oligopoly.‖). William S. 
Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Rewriting History: The Early Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 2 INT‘L J. 
ECON. BUS. 263, 285 (1995) (―[W]e believe that a carefully executed dissolution of [U.S. Steel]—into 
several entities, each with efficient plants—would have led to a more competitive industry in the inter-
war period and would have averted the tragic failures that occurred more recently.‖). On the importance 
of the steel industry, see UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 2–3 (observing that steel was the most important 
war industry); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 583 (1958 (―The iron and steel 
industry is one of the most important, if not the most important of all American industries. Indeed, in 
contemporary international terms, steel production is viewed as a basic measure of the strength and 
status of a country.‖).  
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of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 195011 and, indirectly, to the early 
misguided interpretations of that provision in cases like Brown Shoe12 and 
Von’s.13 In this essay, I will describe the errors of U.S. Steel, the mistaken 
responses to those errors in post-New Deal antitrust, and the role of 
competing ideologies in both. In a final part, I argue that modern reforms 
should assure that both U.S. Steel‘s errors and the excesses of the post-New 
Deal antitrust will not recur. 
II.  IDEOLOGIES OF MONOPOLIZATION 
Both U.S. Steel and its critics were led astray in part by ideologies—
general and largely untestable conceptions of social and political 
causation.14 Ideologies allow us to make sense of complex economic 
phenomena,15 but can mislead by directing analysis away from critical 
evidence.16 Fuller understanding depends on the development and 
application of theory,17 as the next part will show. 
Since the Enlightenment, two great ideologies that I call the 
evolutionary and intentional visions have competed for influence in 
Western political and economic thought.18 In late nineteenth-century 
America, adherents of these ideologies took very different views of the 
trusts.19 In the evolutionary vision, transactions based on contract and 
 
 11.  Cellar-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). I am grateful to Andrew Gavil for suggesting this linkage. 
 12.  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).  
 13.  United States v. Von‘s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 14.  This discussion draws on William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust 
Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Ideological Conflict], which, in turn, draws on THOMAS 
SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS 18-39 (1987) and F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-
70 (1960). See also William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY 
L.J. 1 (1995); William H. Page, The Ideological Origins and Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1 (ABA Antitrust Section, Wayne Dale Collins, ed. 2008). 
 15. See Ideological Conflict, supra note 14, at 9; SOWELL, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that 
ideologies ―set the agenda for both thought and action‖). 
 16.  Cf. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 3 (1998) (―[I]deological 
thinking can be. . .  useful in certain contexts, but in others . . . can mislead and help produce or sustain 
unjust conditions‖); IAN ADAMS, THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL BELIEF: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF 
IDEOLOGY 1–26 (1989). 
 17.  See, e.g., SOWELL, supra note 14, at 14 (ideologies provide ―what we sense or feel before we 
have constructed any systematic reasoning that could be called a theory, much less deduced any specific 
consequences as hypothses to be tested against evidence‖).  
 18.  Id.; HAYEK, supra note 14. Sowell traces the constrained vision (or the evolutionary vision 
in my terminology) to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, & Edmund Burke,. SOWELL, 
supra note 14, at 19–23. He traces the unconstrained vision (or the intentional vision in my 
terminology) to Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and William Godwin. See Id. at 
43–49.  
 19.  Ideological Conflict, supra note 14, at 9–23. For a comprehensive study of the conflict 
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property rights benefit all participants20 and the market organization and 
distribution of wealth that emerge from the countless transactions in the 
economy are spontaneous, unintended, and legitimate.21 Monopolies 
unprotected by state franchises, if they emerge, will soon be eroded by 
entrants seeking to share in the profits.22 If a purely private monopoly 
should persist, it must be because it is providing the best product at the 
lowest cost. Successful trusts thus must have been the product of the 
natural evolution of manufacturing and transportation technology; trusts 
formed for monopolistic reasons would be doomed to failure if unaided by 
government.23 In the evolutionary vision, government can best advance the 
general good, even in the era of the trusts, by providing the conditions for 
free contracting24 and refusing to enforce any contracts that restrain trade. 
In the intentional vision, markets are mechanisms by which the 
wealthy and powerful exploit the weak.25 Far from eroding monopoly, 
market transactions promote it,26 by reinforcing the positions of those with 
the greatest endowments of wealth and property. Big business and its 
promoters created trusts and, later, the corporate form itself to perfect their 
dominance; all trusts were menaces to the economy and the body politic.27 
 
between the visions during this period, see SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE 
STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865–1901 (1956).  
 20.  See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, in BURKE, PAINE, GODWIN, 
AND THE REVOLUTION CONTROVERSY 60, 64 (Marilyn Butler ed., 1984) (observing that it is 
―impossible‖ for free contracts to be onerous to the contracting parties). Perhaps the most influential 
work of the evolutionary vision in this period in the United States was HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL 
STATICS; OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM 
DEVELOPED (1872). See also BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 1–2 (1998).  
 21.  See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 477–78 (Edwin Canaan ed., 2010) (1776) (―By pursuing his own interest [the individual] 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.‖).  
 22.  See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 363 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) 
(―[I]f any trade is overprofitable all throng into it till they bring it to the naturall price, that is, the 
maintenance of the person and the recompense of the risque he runs.‖). 
 23.  See, e.g., FINE, supra note 19, at 72–73 (summarizing laissez-faire economists‘ views of the 
trusts). 
 24.  See, e.g., HERBERT SPENCER, Specialized Administration, in THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 
435, 456–57 (Liberty Classics, 1981) (1884). 
 25.  See, e.g., Ian Fetscher, Rousseau’s Concepts of Freedom in the Light of His Philosophy of 
History, in LIBERTY 29, 54 (NOMOS IV Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1962) (observing that, for Rousseau ―all 
acquisition of wealth appears to be robbery‖). For fuller discussions of the development of these ideas, 
see FINE, supra note 19, at 198–251 (discussing the ―new political economy‖); FRIED, supra note 20, at 
29–47 (discussing the origins of progressivism). 
 26.  See Ideological Conflict, supra note 14, at 7–18 (1991) (summarizing the intentional view 
that powerful firms can insulate themselves from competition). 
 27.  See FINE, supra note 19, at 335–46 (summarizing the academic and popular opposition to 
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In the intentional vision, only government could impose democratic checks 
on trusts by means including dissolution,28 direct regulation, or state 
ownership.29 
The Sherman Act drew on both visions.30 The statute reflected the 
evolutionary vision by adopting not only the common law‘s terminology, 
but also its mode of legal development through judicial precedent31 rather 
than direct regulation of market outcomes.32 Yet it also reflected the 
intentional vision by authorizing governmental intervention to restore 
competitive conditions, which could include the dissolution of unlawful 
trusts. Judicial interpretation of the statutory language has also reflected the 
ideology of the era. In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
evolutionary vision remained influential, but the intentional vision gathered 
strength.33 In interpreting the statute during its early decades, bare 
majorities of the Supreme Court subscribed to a form of the evolutionary 
vision, yet recognized exceptional cases in which governmental 
intervention might be appropriate. The challenge for those holding the 
evolutionary vision was to interpret the Sherman Act to provide meaningful 
standards that could distinguish lawful from unlawful combinations, 
 
the trusts, and the growing calls for governmental control). As Brandeis observed the same year U.S. 
Steel was decided,  
Many believed that concentration (called by its opponents monopoly) was inevitable and 
desirable; and these desired that concentration should be recognized by law and be regulated. 
Others believed that concentration was a source of evil; that existing combinations could be 
disintegrated, if only the judicial machinery were perfected; and that further concentration 
could be averted by providing additional remedies, and particularly through regulating 
competition. 
FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 433 (1920) (dissenting opinion). 
 28.  See FINE, supra note 19, at 336–37. 
 29.  See, e.g., CHARLES WHITING BAKER, MONOPOLIES AND THE PEOPLE 161 (1889) (―But while 
monopolies are inevitable, our subjection to them is not inevitable; and when the public once comes to 
fully understand that the remedy for the evils of monopoly is not abolition, but control, we shall have 
taken a great step toward the settlement of our existing social evils.‖) (emphasis in original); Cf. John 
Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225 (1935). 
 30.  Ideological Conflict, supra note 14, at 36 n.176 (quoting legislative history). See also 
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
53–99 (1965); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN 
TRADITION 164–225 (1955).  
 31.  See 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar) (arguing that the ―great thing that 
this bill does, except affording a remedy, is to extend the common-law principles, which protected fair 
competition in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the United 
States‖). 
 32.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006).  
 33.  HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 1897–1917 21 (1951) (arguing 
that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the nation seemed ―committed to laissez faire,‖ but ―the first 
fifteen years of the new century developed a wave of reform which influenced every phase of American 
social and economic life‖). 
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standards that could apply to both loose-knit combinations like cartels and 
close-knit combinations like trusts. For adherents of the intentional vision, 
the question was which combinations might be excepted from liability. 
III.  MERGERS AND MONOPOLIZATION IN THE FORMATIVE 
PERIOD 
The Supreme Court‘s condemnation of cartels during the 1890s34 
made mergers more attractive as means of acquiring monopoly power.35 
Around the turn of the new century, a wave of mergers created U.S. Steel, a 
new incarnation of Standard Oil, and many other entities, all ―to make 
economies to lessen competition and to get higher profits.‖36 A few years 
later, the Department of Justice began a series of dissolution suits under the 
Sherman Act.37 The Supreme Court‘s resolution of those challenges 
between 1904 and 1920 wrote the earliest drafts of the law of 
monopolization. Standard Oil in 1911was the most important of these 
cases, but it was framed by seminal four-vote opinions: Justice Harlan‘s 
plurality opinion in Northern Securities38 at the outset of the period and 
Justice McKenna‘s majority opinion in U.S. Steel39 at the end. Although the 
intentional vision won the first split decision, the evolutionary vision won 
the last and the series. 
 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass‘n, 166 U.S. 290, 341–42 (1897); 
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass‘n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States, 175 U.S. 211, 240–41 (1899). 
 35.  FAULKNER, supra note 33, at 160–61. 
 36.  Id. at 158 (quoting I Report of the Industrial Commission 9 (1900)). 
 37.  Kovacic, supra note 8, at 1112-16.  
 38.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Justice Brewer concurred in the 
dissolution, but disclaimed Harlan‘s sweeping assertions of the reach of the Act; Justices Holmes and 
White each wrote dissenting opinions.  
 39.  The outcome in U.S. Steel was undoubtedly determined by the recusal of Justices Brandeis 
and McReyolds. See Marc Winerman, Antitrust and the Crisis of ‘07, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 
2008, at 7, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/12/Dec08-Winerman12-22f.pdf. 
Brandeis later hinted at his view of the decision in his dissent in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen 
Stone Cutters‘ Ass‘n of N. Am., 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (Brandeis, J,. dissenting) (suggesting that a union 
boycott must be a reasonable restraint if the Sherman Act permitted capitalists to ―combine in a single 
corporation 50 per cent. of the steel industry of the United States dominating the trade through its vast 
resources.‖). On the precedential value of 4-3 decisions, see Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme 
Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494, 501–08 (1974). The Justice Department later argued, to little 
effect, that U.S. Steel ―should not be followed because it was decided by a minority of the whole 
number of Justices, although a majority of those who sat, and because . . . the Justices who composed 
the majority joining in the opinion later used expressions or said things which were at variance with 
what was said in that opinion.‖ United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  
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The pure forms of both visions were on display in plurality and 
dissenting opinions in the Northern Securities case, which invalidated a 
holding company‘s acquisition of railroads ―having competing and 
substantially parallel lines from the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River 
to the Pacific Ocean at Puget Sound. . . .‖40 For Justice Harlan, the merger 
was unlawful simply because it eliminated rivalry: ―[t]he natural effect of 
competition is to increase commerce, and an agreement whose direct effect 
is to prevent this play of competition restrains instead of promotes trade 
and commerce. . . .‖41 The Sherman Act ―forbid[s] any combination which 
by its necessary operation destroys or restricts free competition among 
those engaged in interstate commerce. . . . ‖42 Large-scale mergers of rivals, 
in other words, should be per se illegal, like cartels. A key dissent, by 
contrast, saw even mergers to monopoly as harmless (or at least beyond the 
reach of the Sherman Act) so long as they were not accompanied by 
coercion of competitors and new entrants. Holmes, joined by White, 
asserted the objection to trusts was ―not the union of former competitors,‖ 
which left the surviving firm free to act independently, ―but the sinister 
power exercised or supposed to be exercised by the combination in keeping 
rivals out of the business and ruining those who already were in. It was the 
ferocious extreme of competition with others, not the cessation of 
competition among the partners, that was the evil feared.‖43 This 
combination of railroads, he suggested, must be lawful because it had no 
exclusionary purpose44 and, unlike a cartel, imposed no continuing restraint 
on the contracting firms.45 
Standard Oil46 held unlawful the merger that formed the defendant, 
but took the Holmesian view of private monopoly. The district court held 
that the merger ―constituted a combination in restraint of trade and also an 
attempt to monopolize and a monopolization under Section 2‖ of the 
Sherman Act.47 Chief Justice White affirmed, but not because the merger 
 
 40.  Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 326. 
 41.  Id. at 331. See also Robin A. Prager, The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition: The 
Case of the Northern Securities Company, 23 RAND J. ECON. 123 (1992) (concluding that the merger 
reduced competition). 
 42.  Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 337. 
 43.  Id. at 405 (dissenting opinion). In a separate opinion, joined by Holmes and two others, 
White dissented on the grounds that the Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
the ownership of stock in the railroads. Id. at 370. 
 44.  Id. at 408 ( ―[T]he size of the combination is reached for other ends than those which would 
make them monopolies [and that the] combinations are not formed for the purpose of excluding others 
from the field‖). 
 45.  Id. at 410–11. 
 46.  Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 47.  Id. at 45. See also Id. at 72–74 (affirming the district court‘s conclusion that the combination 
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created a monopoly; that only raised what White called (in a 
characteristically redundant formulation) a ―prima facie presumption‖ that 
the acquisition was unlawful. Like Holmes in Northern Securities, White 
thought that the combination could only be harmful if accompanied by 
coercion against existing and potential rivals. White noted that the Sherman 
Act, by prohibiting monopolization rather than monopoly, 
indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to 
contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient 
means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the 
centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely 
contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably 
prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to 
make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were 
permitted.48 
Private contracting would erode monopoly unless checked by a 
―sovereign power,‖ as the evolutionary vision recognized, but also a 
limited category of ―contracts having a monopolistic tendency,‖ to exclude 
rivals or deter entry. 
The defendants in Standard Oil contended that the trust was a natural 
step in the progress of the industry, ―serving to stimulate and increase 
production, to widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum 
at a cost largely below that which would have otherwise prevailed, thus 
proving to be at one and the same time a benefaction to the general public 
as well as of enormous advantage to individuals.‖49 White, however, saw 
the merger not as an expression of ―normal methods of industrial 
development,‖ but of new means of exclusion that hindered the self-
correcting mechanisms of the market:50 
the very genius for commercial development and organization which it 
would seem was manifested from the beginning soon begot an intent and 
purpose to exclude others which was frequently manifested by acts and 
dealings wholly inconsistent with the theory that they were made with 
the single conception of advancing the development of business power 
 
―operated to destroy the ‗potentiality of competition‘ which otherwise would have existed to such an 
extent as to cause the transfers of stock which were made to the New Jersey corporation and the control 
which resulted over the many and various subsidiary corporations‖ a violation of sections 1 and 2).  
 48.  Id. at 62. 
 49.  Id. at 48.  
 50.  Id. at 75. Not all contracts imposing restrictive conditions were monopolistic, however, 
because market participants can always reject the project if the price, ―in dollars or conditions‖ is higher 
than the participants‘ ―voluntary judgment of [the] utility‖ of the monopolist‘s product. United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 65 (1918). 
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by usual methods, but which on the contrary necessarily involved the 
intent to drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right 
to trade, and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end in view.51 
Standard Oil‘s predatory conduct confirmed the ―prima facie 
presumption‖ that the merger to monopoly was unlawful. 
In U.S. Steel, the Court considered the legality of a merger that had 
created the largest company in the world.52 U.S. Steel had an initial 
capitalization of $1.4 billion, about one quarter of that year‘s gross national 
product.53 The merger combined twelve major steel producers (themselves 
created by earlier combinations of 180 companies), including Carnegie 
Steel Company, Federal Steel Company, and National Steel Company, to 
achieve market shares ranging from roughly 40 percent in pig iron to 71 
percent in wire rods.54 In 1907, it acquired its largest remaining competitor, 
the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company, with the advance 
approval of President Roosevelt.55 
Unlike Andrew Carnegie, Judge Elbert Gary, who led U.S. Steel until 
his death in 1927,56 considered competition ―immoral and unprofitable.‖57 
He later testified before Congress that Carnegie had tried ―to keep his mills 
busy. . . [even if it meant selling] at prices which were ruinous to his 
competitors, because down to about his cost was very much below the cost 
of others. In my opinion, that was a very bad policy.‖58 Instead, Gary 
sought to limit competition by mergers and price restraints. Aware that his 
strategies were legally dubious, however, he formulated a two-part antitrust 
compliance program.59 First, he adopted policies that limited U.S. Steel‘s 
 
 51.  Standard Oil, 221 U.S.. at 76. 
 52.  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 
132 (1990). 
 53.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 182–83; KENNETH WARREN, BIG STEEL: THE FIRST 
CENTURY OF THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 1901–2001 1 (2001). 
54. Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 182 (showing U.S. Steel‘s market shares in 1902 and 1910 for pig 
iron (44.7 and 43.3 percent), ingots and castings (66.3 and 54.7 percent), Bessemer steel rails (65.4 and 
60.2 percent), open hearth steel rails (0 and 57.4 percent), structural shapes (57.9 and 51.3 percent), 
plates and sheets (59.4 and 48.0 percent), wire rods (71.5 and 67.3 percent), wire nails (64.8 and 55.4 
percent), and tin plate (n/a and 61.0 percent)). 
 55.  See Winerman, supra note 39, at 6–7. 
 56.  WARREN, supra note 53, at 128. 
 57.  CHANDLER, supra note 52, at 134 (quoting ROBERT HESSEN, STEEL TITAN: THE LIFE OF 
CHARLES M. SCHWAB 186 (1990))., . 
 58.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 209 (quoting United States Steel Corporation, Hearings 
before the House Comm. on Investigation of United States Steel Corporation, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 197 
(1911)). 
 59.  See GERTRUDE G. SCHROEDER, THE GROWTH OF MAJOR STEEL COMPANIES, 1900–1950 
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market share in each of its product lines to around 50 percent because, he 
later admitted, that was the number that William Jennings Bryan had 
argued should be established as a statutory maximum.60 Second, he 
withdrew from explicit cartels and so-called statistical associations61 but 
implemented the Gary dinner system, in which committees of producers in 
each product line announced their pricing intentions while disclaiming any 
agreement with rivals.62 When that system came under official scrutiny in 
1911, he abandoned it,63 yet continued to pursue a policy of price and 
output restraint and at least tacit price coordination, except in export 
markets.64 
These two strategies were successful. The Supreme Court majority 
agreed with two members of the district court panel that the Corporation 
had been formed in an attempt to achieve monopoly power, but that the 
realities of the market—the centrifugal and centripetal forces that Chief 
Justice White had traced to freedom of contract—prevented the 
Corporation from achieving its goal. The absence of the ―brutalities‖65 of 
Standard Oil showed U.S. Steel‘s incapacity to exclude rivals. In a key 
 
44–45 (1952). 
 60.  IDA M. TARBELL, THE LIFE OF ELBERT H. GARY: THE STORY OF STEEL 257–58 (1925). The 
Democratic Party adopted this policy as part of its platform in the 1908 elections. Democractic Party, 
Democratic Party Platform of 1908 (July 7, 1908), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29589#axzz1MXqflKdM. See also Thomas K. 
McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. Steel’s Pricing, Investment, and Market Share, 1901–
1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 593, 610–13 (1989).  
 61.  UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 62.  Page, Gary Dinners, supra note 6. 
 63.  Id. at 610. 
 64.  WARREN, supra note 52, at 32 (observing that Gary instituted ―collaborative action and . . . 
stable, open price structures helped preserve existing centers of production yet at the same time 
provided shelter under which new producers could not only compete but also earn higher than average 
profits.‖); CHANDLER, supra note 52, at 135–36 (observing that Gary sacrificed profit to avoid 
dismemberment of the company). 
 65.  U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 441. The Court summarized the district court‘s findings that U.S. 
Steel 
did not secure freight rebates; it did not increase its profits by reducing the wages of its 
employees—whatever it did was not at the expense of labor; it did not increase its profits by 
lowering the quality of its products, nor create an artificial scarcity of them; it did not oppress 
or coerce its competitors-its competition, though vigorous, was fair; it did not undersell its 
competitors in some localities by reducing its prices there below these maintained elsewhere, 
or require its customers to enter into contracts limiting their purchases or restricting them in 
resale prices; it did not obtain customers by secret rebates or departures from its published 
prices; there was no evidence that it attempted to crush its competitors or drive them out of 
the market, nor did it take customers from its competitors by unfair means, and in its 
competition it seemed to make no difference between large and small competitors. 
 Id. 
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passage, the U.S. Steel Court extracted the meaning of Standard Oil: 
The Standard Oil Company had its origin in 1882 and through successive 
forms of combinations and agencies it progressed in illegal power to the 
day of the decree, even attempting to circumvent by one of its forms the 
decision of a court against it. And its methods in using its power was 
[sic] of the kind that [the district judge in U.S. Steel] described as 
―brutal,‖ and of which practices, he said, the Steel Corporation was 
absolutely guiltless. . . . And of the practices this court said no 
disinterested mind could doubt that the purpose was ―to drive others 
from the field, and to exclude them from their right to trade, and thus 
accomplish the mastery which was the end in view.‖ It was further said 
that what was done and the final culmination ―‗in the plan of the New 
Jersey corporation‘ made ‗manifest the continued existence of the intent . 
. . and . . . impelled the expansion of the New Jersey corporation.‘‖ It 
was to this corporation, which represented the power and purpose of all 
that preceded, that the suit was addressed and the decree of the court was 
to apply.66 
Standard Oil‘s ―original wrong was reflected in and manifested by the 
acts which followed the organization.‖67 Thus, ―the court had to deal with a 
persistent and systematic lawbreaker masquerading under legal forms, and 
which not only had to be stripped of its disguises but arrested in its 
illegality. A decree of dissolution was the manifest instrumentality and 
inevitable.‖68 
The U.S. Steel combination was different. First, although it achieved 
market shares in steel manufacturing of well over 50 percent in most 
markets, it gradually lost ground.69 The declines showed, as the district 
court put it, ―a strong trend away from any monopolistic absorption or 
trade-restraining control of iron and steel manufacture or markets of the 
United States by the Steel Corporation.‖70 Second, unlike earlier trusts that 
had made rivals offers they could not refuse—―to become parties to the 
illegal enterprise or be driven ‗out of the business‘‖71—U.S. Steel ―did not 
oppress or coerce its competitors.‖72 Instead, it tried to induce rivals to fix 
prices ―by pools, associations, trade meetings, and through the social form 
 
 66.  U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 455 (quoting Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 76–77). 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 457. 
 69.  U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 439 n. 1 (1920). It continued to lose ground in ensuing decades. See, 
e.g., George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 23, 30 (1950) 
(estimating a 30 percent share of ingot capacity by the late 1940s). 
 70.  United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 67 (D.N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
 71.  U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 456 . 
 72.  Id. at 441. 
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of dinners,‖73 but failed because of the ―operation of forces that were not 
understood or were underestimated.‖74 These forces, no doubt, were the 
same ones that White had suggested could usually thwart monopolistic 
aspirations by freedom of contract alone. U.S. Steel‘s efforts at collusion, 
although illegal when they were in effect, evidenced only that the 
Corporation lacked the power unilaterally to exploit purchasers. 
McKenna seemed mystified by the government‘s claim that a 
combination with significantly less than 100 percent of the market could 
reduce competition without engaging in coercion. He found the 
government‘s arguments to the contrary inconsistent: 
In one [argument] competitors (the independents) are represented as 
oppressed by the superior power of the Corporation; in the other they are 
represented as ascending to opulence by imitating that power‘s prices 
which they could not do if at disadvantage from the other conditions of 
competition; and yet confederated action is not asserted.75 
If the Corporation did not coerce its rivals, the government‘s only 
complaint was about its size, but ―the law does not make mere size an 
offence,‖ only ―overt acts.‖76 In his dissent, Justice Day agreed with the 
proposition that ―the act offers no objection to the mere size of a 
corporation, nor to the continued exertion of its lawful power,‖ but only 
―when that size and power have been obtained by lawful means and 
developed by natural growth77.‖ In such a case, the firm is ―entitled to 
maintain its size and the power that legitimately goes with it.‖78 Where the 
firm acquires its monopoly power by merger, the dissent recognized, the 
formation of the corporation itself is the unlawful act. 
 
 73.  Id. at 445. It summarized the district court‘s finding that U.S. Steel 
combined its power with that of its competitors. It did not have power in and of itself, and the control it 
exerted was only in and by association with its competitors. Its offense, therefore, such as it was, was 
not different from theirs and was distinguished from ―theirs only in the leadership it assumed in 
promulgating and perfecting the policy.‖ This leadership it gave up and it had ceased to offend against 
the law before this suit was brought. It was hence concluded that it should be distinguished from its 
organizers and that their intent and unsuccessful attempt should not be attributed to it, that it ―in and of 
itself is not now and has never been a monopoly or a combination in restraint of trade,‖ and a decree of 
dissolution should not be entered against it. Id. at 441. 
 74.  Id. at 445. It seems unlikely that U.S. Steel‘s efforts to fix prices ended (if they did end) 
because they had failed; it is more likely because of the impending government antitrust suit and other 
investigations. Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 216. 
 75.  U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 445. 
 76.  Id. at 451. 
 77.  Id. at 460. 
 78.  Id. . 
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IV.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RECORD IN U.S. STEEL 
Economic analysis has shown the error of McKenna‘s account of the 
effects of the creation of U.S. Steel.79 The court lacked ―a theoretical 
structure to guide its thinking,‖ particularly the theory of partial monopoly 
or dominant firm pricing.80 Consequently, it ―was simply uncertain of the 
application of the Sherman Act when less than a complete monopoly was 
attained‖ and therefore rested its decision on the absence of ―morally 
corrupt overt acts.‖81 We can now see that the combination creating U.S. 
Steel gave it large enough shares in the relevant markets to engage in forms 
of dominant firm pricing. In the classic model of dominant-firm pricing, the 
dominant firm cedes a portion of the market to a competitive fringe of 
small, price-taking firms and treats the residual portion of the market as its 
monopoly.82 The dominant firm sets its output at the point at which its 
marginal cost equals its marginal revenue for the residual portion of the 
market and chooses the corresponding price on its residual demand curve; 
the competitive fringe, as price-takers, expand output to the point at which 
their marginal cost equals the dominant firm‘s price. The resulting price is 
higher and the resulting output is lower than under competition, but neither 
difference is as great as would be the case under pure monopoly. 
Modern economic studies of the record and the available economic 
data suggest that U.S. Steel pursued a policy of dominant firm pricing, with 
periods of disciplinary price reductions (or dynamic limit pricing) and 
explicit or implicit price coordination with rivals.83 In his classic study, The 
 
 79.  One study of the economic evidence in U.S. Steel concluded that McKenna 
was simply uncertain of the application of the Sherman Act when less than complete monopoly 
was attained by legitimate business practices. The consequences of partial control of a market were 
apparently unclear to the Court and the absence of morally corrupt overt acts did not give it any 
clues of the distortions possible from such a structure. . . . Without a theoretical structure to guide 
its thinking, the Court could legitimately require some evidence of social damage before 
undertaking such a major step as restructuring of the steel industry. Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, 
at 217. 
 80.  Id. The economic theory of dominant firm pricing existed, but was evidently not widely 
understood, particularly by courts. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
437, 450 n. 26 (2010), which ascribes the theory to Karl Forchheimer, Theoretisches zum 
Unvollständigen Monopole [The Theory of Partial Monopoly], in 32 JAHRBUCH FÜR GESETZGEBUNG, 
VERWALTUNG UND VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT IM DEUTSCHEN REICH 1 (Gustav Schmoller ed., 1908).   
 81.  Parson & Ray, supra note 9, at 217. 
 82.  Kaplow, supra note80, at 449–50; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power 
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 944–52 (1981).. 
 83.  CHANDLER, supra note 52, at 136 (observing that, after the Gary dinners, U.S. Steel ―set a 
price that permitted the existing companies to compete for market share but reduced the incentive to 
expand output rapidly‖); Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. Steel’s Pricing, 
Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901–1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 593, 602–04 (1989) 
(suggesting that U.S. Steel pursued a policy of dynamic limit pricing that gradually ceded market share 
to rivals); Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 206–08 (arguing that U.S. Steel had dominant market shares, 
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Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella,84 George Stigler, at the 
suggestion of Aaron Director, sought to explain the striking fact that the 
U.S. Steel‘s initial book value of $1.4 billion was twice the value of the 
assets of the firms it subsumed. Was the merger a stock watering scheme 
aimed at bilking investors or a realistic measure of the firm‘s expected 
profits from dominant firm pricing? Stock market data provided the 
answer: investors in U.S. Steel achieved better returns than investors in all 
but one of U.S. Steel‘s rivals.85 Consequently, Stigler concluded, the 
merger creating U.S. Steel was ―a master stroke of monopoly promotion‖ 
by J.P. Morgan.86 A later event study showed that the initial filing of the 
dissolution suit in 1911 increased the stock price of railroads that were U.S. 
Steel‘s largest customers and that the government‘s eventual defeat in 1920 
reduced the stock price of the same railroads.87 The authors concluded that 
U.S. Steel was charging noncompetitive prices and that dissolution would 
have reduced prices significantly. 
The Court also erred in suggesting that U.S. Steel‘s participation in 
various forms of price fixing, including the Gary dinners, was somehow 
inconsistent with its possession of monopoly power. A dominant firm and 
the competitive fringe receive noncompetitive returns, but can increase 
their joint profits still more by setting a pure monopoly price and output. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that U.S. Steel and its larger rivals 
 
but also coordinated prices with rivals to avoid losing market share in periods of low demand); Hideki 
Yamawaki, Dominant Firm Pricing and Fringe Expansion: The Case of the U.S. Iron and Steel 
Industry, 1907–1930, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 429, 437 (1985) (presenting evidence that U.S. Steel 
acted as a dominant firm by ―set[ting] its price in response to the fringe‘s market share, while the 
fringe‘s market share was determined by the dominant firm‘s price through its effects on both long-run 
capacity and short-run output decisions by the competitive fringe.‖). But cf. George L. Mullin, Joseph 
C. Mullin & Wallace P. Mullin, The Competitive Effects of Mergers: Stock Market Evidence from the 
U.S. Steel Dissolution Suit, 26 RAND J. ECON. 314, 315 (1995) (quoting GABRIEL KOLKO, THE 
TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963) 
(echoing the majority opinion that ―the steel industry was competitive before the World War, and the 
efforts by the House of Morgan to establish control and stability over the steel industry by voluntary, 
private economic means had failed‖))). 
 84.  GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella, in THE ORGANIZATION 
OF INDUSTRY 108 (1968).  
 85.  This result confirms the dissent‘s assessment in U.S. Steel itself. 
The enormous overcapitalization of companies and the appropriation of $100,000,000 in 
stock to promotion expenses were represented in the stock issues of the new organizations 
thus formed, and were the basis upon which large dividends have been declared from the 
profits of the business. . . . It is the irresistible conclusion from these premises that great 
profits to be derived from unified control were the object of these organizations. 
United States v. U.S.Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 459 (1920) (Day, J., dissenting). 
 86.  STIGLER, supra note 84 at 112. 
 87. Mullin, Mullin & Mullin, supra note 83 at 315. 
PAGE4 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  12:06 PM 
2012] PREDATION AND COLLUSION 115 
coordinated prices and output throughout the relevant period, even after the 
end of the public Gary dinner episode. U.S. Steel may have maintained its 
market share in part because of its vertical control of rich iron ore 
supplies.88 Even at that, however, a simple dominant firm strategy would 
likely have caused U.S. Steel to suffer greater losses in market share than it 
actually did during periods of low demand. One study infers that ―the 
industry might be more properly characterized as a ‗dominant cartel.‘‖89 
The industry was able to increase its profit further by a consistent policy of 
price discrimination in exports.90 
V.  MISREADING THE ERRORS OF U.S. STEEL: POST-NEW DEAL 
MONOPOLIZATION AND MERGER LAW 
Chief Justice White pointed to Standard Oil‘s predatory conduct as 
proof that the consolidation creating it was monopolistic and not a 
legitimate effort to achieve the benefits of large scale production. Justice 
McKenna pointed to U.S. Steel‘s abjuration of comparable predatory 
conduct as proof that the consolidation creating the Corporation, although 
monopolistic in original intent, was benign in ultimate effect.91 As we have 
just seen, this application of Standard Oil was a serious error. It ratified a 
merger that made the American steel industry less competitive for decades 
and derailed the government‘s efforts to dissolve other consolidations of 
the great merger wave and beyond. 
In part because of U.S. Steel, the antitrust laws came to be viewed as 
ineffective.92 Thurman Arnold famously portrayed them as largely 
symbolic devices that expressed moral disapproval, but permitted big 
 
 88.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 184 (―The ownership of iron ore deposits appears as a key 
factor in the slow rate of entry of new firms as U.S. Steel methodically attempted to foreclose high 
quality ore supplies.‖). But cf. Joseph C. Mullin & Wallace P. Mullin, United States Steel’s Acquisition 
of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance, 13 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74 (1997) (concluding that one of U.S. Steel‘s major acquisitions was made for 
efficiency reasons).   
 89.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 208. There is evidence that the industry engaged in price 
fixing in later periods as well. Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The 
U.S. Steel Industry, 1933–1939, 32 J.L. & ECON. S47 (1989).   
 90.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 192. Interestingly, the government argued that U.S. Steel‘s 
export activities were beneficial and suggested that they could be continued through an export cartel 
under the Webb Act.  
 91.  Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 44 (1937) (observing 
that ―whatever are considered to be the evils resulting from monopoly—enhancement of price, 
deterioration of product, or the like—a monopolistic situation, or an attempt to monopolize, is 
evidenced to the courts primarily, if not exclusively, by a limitation of the freedom to compete‖). 
 92.  George W. Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and Monopoly, 64 YALE 
L.J. 1107, 1125 (1955). 
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business to thrive using more ―respectable‖ tactics like ―market dominance 
and price leadership‖ rather than predatory pricing or cartels.93 This 
perception of ineffectiveness took on new urgency during the Great 
Depression, which some ascribed to the prevalence of monopoly and 
consequent under-consumption.94 During the New Deal, advocates of 
versions of the intentional vision competed for influence in the Roosevelt 
administration.95 In the early years, federal policy sought to regulate market 
behavior directly through agencies like the National Recovery 
Administration.96 In the late New Deal, however, anti-monopolists in the 
tradition of Brandeis gained greater influence in the executive branch and 
pressed for a broad policy of decentralization, in part by reinvigoration of 
monopolization and merger enforcement.97 For many of these officials, the 
antipathy to concentration took precedence over productive and distributive 
efficiency.98 
The influence of these ideas led to much more aggressive antitrust 
enforcement, initially (and paradoxically) under the leadership of Thurman 
Arnold.99 After World War II, many of the Justice Department‘s policy 
positions found support in the emerging structuralist theory of industrial 
organization.100 Lawyers during this period gradually came ―around to the 
economists‘ view and increasingly were identifying monopoly as a 
structural rather than behavioral problem.‖101 As Joe Bain later summarized 
the theory, ―structure is systematically associated with or determines 
conduct; and conduct, as determined by structure, determines 
performance.‖102 Structuralists recognized that that U.S. Steel was wrongly 
decided. George Stocking observed in 1955, for example, that U.S. Steel 
mistakenly concluded that ―unless [the defendant‘s] conduct is predatory, 
combinations falling short of monopoly under the rule of reason as 
 
 93.  THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 227 (1937) ( ―[T]he antitrust laws, 
instead of breaking up great organizations, served only to make them respectable . . . by providing them 
with the clothes of rugged individualism.‖). 
 94.  See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 295 (1966). 
 95.  See Id, at 283–304 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id..  
 98.  Id. at 287. 
 99.  Id. at 420–55. See also ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN 
RECESSION AND WAR 106–36 (1995). 
 100.  Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 311, 346–59 (2009). 
 101.  Id. at 349. 
 102.  JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329 (2d ed. 1968) 
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originally enunciated are beyond the statute‘s reach.‖103 Analyzed from a 
structuralist perspective, Stocking argued, the U.S. Steel combination 
should have been unlawful because it resulted in a market that ―did not 
conform to the standard of workable competition. Its structure contributed 
to conduct incompatible with an effective interplay of market forces, and 
its structure and conduct resulted in unacceptable performance.‖104 
But, the emphasis on structure as the determinant of conduct and 
performance led some courts to draw the wrong legal inferences from U.S. 
Steel‘s errors. U.S. Steel undoubtedly made the antitrust laws ineffective 
against monopolistic mergers. In post-New Deal antitrust, however, some 
courts took the equally mistaken view that the antitrust laws should prohibit 
monopolies achieved and maintained by efficient conduct and mergers that 
created efficiencies and posed no risk of noncompetitive pricing.105 Here 
again, ideologies played a leading role. As I observed in an earlier study, 
post-New Deal legal realists saw the decisions of antitrust‘s formative 
period, like Standard Oil and U.S. Steel, as the product of laissez-faire 
ideology and legal formalism; they sought to cut through that formalism to 
reveal social and economic reality. But this approach to antitrust ―reflected 
a new conceptualism and a new formalism that were as rigid as those they 
supplanted. The formal realists mistook their own intentionalist 
preconceptions for reality, and accepted economic and social 
generalizations that were consistent with those views. In the antitrust 
context, they were willing to base bright-line rules of liability on those 
preconceptions.‖106 
A.  MONOPOLIZATION 
In Alcoa, Judge Hand suggested that U.S. Steel‘s error lay in requiring 
a showing of predatory acts like those of Standard Oil in any 
monopolization case, including one like Alcoa, in which the defendant had 
acquired its monopoly power lawfully.107 He pointed to U.S. Steel as ―the 
most extreme expression of [the] view‖ that the ―successful competitor, 
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.‖108 
He cited Justice McKenna‘s statement that ―the law does not make mere 
size an offense,‖ but ―requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of 
 
 103.  Stocking, supra note 92, at 1125. 
 104.  Id. at 1135–36. 
 105.   
 106.  William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 24 
(1995). 
 107.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).. 
 108.   Id. at 430. 
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them.‖109 In the same footnote, he quoted Justice Day‘s acknowledgment in 
dissent that a firm that acquires monopoly power by ―natural growth . . . is 
entitled to maintain its size and the power that legitimately goes with it, 
provided no law has been transgressed in obtaining it.110 
At this point in his opinion, Hand ignored Justice Day‘s crucial 
distinction between monopoly power acquired by unilateral expansion and 
monopoly power acquired by merger.111 This omission was fully consistent 
with the emerging structuralist paradigm. As Donald Turner later put the 
idea, ―whatever the economic costs of continuing monopoly may be, they 
are the same regardless of the monopoly‘s origin.‖112 From this 
perspective, both the majority and the dissent in U.S. Steel erred in 
recognizing a right of any monopolist to compete on the merits. 
Consequently, Hand reasoned, even a monopolist that acquires 
monopoly power lawfully violates Section 2 unless ―it falls within the 
exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, 
the control of a market.‖113 Alcoa failed this test by ―anticipat[ing] 
increases in the demand for ingot and be[ing] prepared to supply them:‖ 
[W]e can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to 
embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer 
with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the 
advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. 
Only in case we interpret ―exclusion‖ as limited to manoeuvres [sic] not 
honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent 
competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 
―exclusionary.‖ So to limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; 
would permit just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent.114 
 
 109.  Id. at 430 n.2 (quoting United States v. U.S.Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451(1920). 
 110.  Id. (quoting U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 460) (Day, J., dissenting). 
 111.  Earlier in the opinion, Hand suggested that a merger to monopoly was monopolization per 
se, while achieving a monopoly by internal expansion was monopolization unless it was accidental. 
It does not follow because ‗Alcoa‘ had such a monopoly, that it ‗monopolized‘ the ingot 
market: it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it. If it had 
been a combination of existing smelters which united the whole industry and controlled the 
production of all aluminum ingot, it would certainly have ‘monopolized’ the market. In 
several decisions the Supreme Court has decreed the dissolution of such combinations, 
although they had engaged in no unlawful trade practices.  
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429 (emphasis added) (citing railroad cases, but conspicuously not U.S. Steel). 
 112.  Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1220 (1969). For a much earlier expression of this view, see Herbert Pope, The 
Legal Aspect of Monopoly, 20 HARV. L. REV. 167, 191 (1907). 
 113.  Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431.  
 114.  Id.  
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Judge Wyzanski endorsed this view in United Shoe Machinery.115 He 
read Standard Oil, as interpreted by McKenna in U.S. Steel, as 
―encourag[ing] the view that there was no monopolization unless defendant 
had resorted to predatory practices.‖116 ―But,‖ Wyzanki continued ―a 
reversal of trend was effectuated through the landmark opinion of Judge 
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.‖117 In that 
case, Judge Hand: 
did not rest his judgment on the corporation‘s coercive or immoral 
practices. Instead, adopting an economic approach, he defined the 
appropriate market, found that Alcoa supplied 90% of it, determined that 
this control constituted a monopoly, and ruled that since Alcoa 
established this monopoly by its voluntary actions, such as building new 
plants, though, it was assumed, not by moral derelictions, it had 
―monopolized‖ in violation of §2.118 
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century, a firm that had achieved 
monopoly power lawfully could run afoul of Section 2 by engaging in 
―voluntary‖ and ―honestly industrial‖ conduct like ―building new 
plants.‖119 
This definition of exclusionary conduct essentially equates harm to 
competition with harm to rivals in monopolization cases. In this respect, it 
echoes Justice McKenna‘s mistaken focus on the absence of harm to rivals 
in this exoneration of U.S. Steel: ―We may wonder at it,‖ he wrote, 
―wonder that the despotism of the Corporation, so baneful to the world in 
the representation of the Government, did not produce protesting 
victims.‖120 It is a short step from McKenna‘s absolution of U.S. Steel 
because it had not hurt rivals to Hand‘s condemnation of Alcoa because it 
had hurt rivals. ―The search for victims is, in fact, the reason courts have 
tended to protect competitors and not competition: the ‗victims‘ of 
 
 115.  United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (1953). 
 116.  Judge Wyzanki also mentioned United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32 
(1918) as a monopolization case unduly focused on predation. That case, however, rested on the 
conclusion that the merger creating the defendant combined producers of noncompeting machines used 
in different aspects of the shoe manufacturing process. Id. at 44–45. 
 117.  Alcoa,148 F.2d at 416 . 
 118.  United Shoe Mach., 110 F.Supp. at 341.  
 119.  See also Eugene Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 567, 577 (1947). Judge Wyzanski placed ―beyond criticism . . . the high quality of 
United‘s products, its understanding of the techniques of shoemaking and the needs of shoe 
manufacturers, its efficient design and improvement of machines, and its prompt and knowledgeable 
service.‖ United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 344. He condemned practices, like the defendant‘s policy 
of leasing rather than selling machines, that were ―honestly industrial,‖ yet not the ―inevitable 
consequences of ability, natural forces, or law.‖ Id.  
 120.  United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S 417, 449 (1920).  
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competition are frequently quite vocal and not hard to find,‖ while 
consumers, the victims of U.S. Steel‘s collusion with rivals, are ―largely 
ignorant of the damage they suffered.‖121 In the following section, we will 
see that the law of mergers took a similarly perverse turn. 
B.  MERGERS 
Had the Court dissolved U.S. Steel in 1920, the rule of reason might 
have become the principal legal standard for evaluating mergers. Instead, 
enforcers came to view Section 1 of the Sherman Act as ineffective as a 
means of blocking or dissolving even clearly anticompetitive mergers. In 
1922, for example, the Attorney General pointed to the decision as a reason 
for not challenging mergers by Bethlehem Steel122 that later economists 
suggest may have ―played an important role in controlling price cutting and 
capacity expansion‖ during the 1920s.123 The failure of Section 1 during 
this period set the stage for later developments that confused the law of 
mergers for over two decades. 
In the post-New Deal era, the government sought to reinvigorate 
merger enforcement along with monopolization enforcement.124 It targeted 
more than mergers that created firms that could exercise monopoly power 
unilaterally or in concert with rivals, as U.S Steel had done.125 In the newly 
ascendant intentional vision, mergers were suspect if they enhanced the 
competitiveness of the surviving firm at the expense of smaller rivals. Just 
as Judge Hand had suggested that a dominant firm could monopolize by 
―honestly industrial‖ competition that hurt its rivals,126 the government now 
argued that mergers should be unlawful if they allowed the surviving firm 
to compete more effectively and, thus, hurt its rivals.127 
The turning point in this campaign was another case against U.S. 
Steel. In Columbia Steel128 in 1948, the government lost its challenge to 
U.S. Steel‘s acquisition of the assets of Consolidated Steel, a steel 
 
 121.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 217–18.  
 122.  SCHROEDER, supra note 59, at 101. The FTC challenged some steel mergers, but with little 
success. Id. at 101–03. One investigation ended when the Supreme Court held that the FTC lacked 
authority to order dissolution of a merger consummated before any challenge. FTC v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 274 U.S. 619, 624 (1927). 
 123.  Parsons & Ray, supra note 9, at 213. 
 124.  
 125.  
 126.  Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 127.  
 128.  United States v. Colom. Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).  
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fabricator that purchased 3 percent of the rolled steel sold in the 11 western 
states in which Consolidated sold its products.129 The government 
contended, in an argument reminiscent of Harlan‘s opinion in Northern 
Securities, that the acquisition was per se illegal under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act because it excluded U.S. Steel‘s rivals in the production of 
rolled steel.130 Justice Reed, however, writing for a bare majority of the 
Court, sensibly concluded that ―[e]xclusive dealings for rolled steel 
between Consolidated and United States Steel, brought about by vertical 
integration or otherwise, are not illegal, at any rate until the effect of such 
control is to unreasonably restrict the opportunities of competitors to 
market their product,‖ which could not occur from the foreclosure of 3 
percent of a narrowly defined geographic market.131 U.S. Steel also 
produced some types of fabricated steel, but the Court did not think the 
horizontal aspects of the merger were likely to reduce competition either.132 
In a florid dissent for four members of the Court, Justice Douglas 
argued that the merger should be blocked because U.S. Steel—a firm that 
was the product of numerous earlier mergers and that produced 51 percent 
of the rolled steel sold in the western United States—was acquiring a 
significant customer, particularly of rolled plates and shapes.133 
Competition, he wrote, ―is never more irrevocably eliminated than by 
buying the customer for whose business the industry has been 
competing.‖134 Douglas continued: 
 
 129.  Id. at 527. 
 130.  Id. at 519. Herbert Hovenkamp notes that in this period ―arguments against vertical 
integration became increasingly fantastic, including the claims that a firm could vertically integrate in 
order to force its own subsidiary to purchase at monopoly prices; that vertically integrated firms 
received an unfair advantage because they could buy from their subsidiaries at cost, while others had to 
pay monopoly prices; or that they engaged in predation by charging below cost prices at one level, 
subsidized by excessive profits at a different level.‖ Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical 
Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95 IOWA L. Rev. 863, 915 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 131.  Colom. Steel, 334 U.S. at 524. 
 132.  Id. at 529–30. The Court also rejected the government‘s contention that the acquisition was 
an attempt to monopolize in light of the much earlier consolidations that created U.S. Steel itself. Id. 
The Court noted that ―the acquisition of a firm outlet to absorb a portion of [the] rolled steel 
production‖ of a plant purchased from the government after the war, with the Attorney General‘s 
blessing ―seems to reflect a normal business purpose rather than a scheme to circumvent the law.‖ Id. at 
532–33. The Court also noted U.S. Steel‘s market share had declined, by the end of the war, to just over 
30 percent. Id.. 
 133.  Id. at 538–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 134.  Id. at 537. This rationale later won the day in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), which held unlawful du Pont‘s acquisition (in 1917) of stock of General 
Motors, a large customer of its fabrics and finishes, because GM preferred du Pont‘s products as inputs.  
As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, ―[b]ecause the only economic purpose of vertical integration is 
self-provision or self-distribution, the government‘s position was basically that vertical integration was 
legal only if it made no economic sense to do so in the first place.‖ Hovenkamp, supra note 130, at 916. 
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We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have 
been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows 
how size can become a menace—both industrial and social. It can be an 
industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing or 
putative competitors. It can be a social menace—because of its control of 
prices. . . . In final analysis, size in steel is the measure of the power of a 
handful of men over our economy. . . . The philosophy of the Sherman 
Act is that it should not exist. For all power tends to develop into a 
government in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the 
hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an 
industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It should 
be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not 
be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the 
emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. . . . 
The Court forgot this lesson in [U.S. Steel]. The Court today forgets it 
when it allows United States Steel to wrap its tentacles tighter around the 
steel industry of the West. . . . It is a purchase for control, a purchase for 
control of a market for which United States Steel has in the past had to 
compete but which it no longer wants left to the uncertainties that 
competition in the West may engender. . . .135 
As the Supreme Court later recognized, Columbia Steel ―stirred 
concern whether the Sherman Act alone was a check against corporate 
acquisition.‖136 In response to the decision, Congress ―enacted the Cellar-
Kefauver Antimerger Act in 1950 to ―bring mergers within § 7 and thereby 
close what it regarded as a loophole in the section [and] to reach 
transactions such as that involved in Columbia Steel, which was a simple 
purchase of assets and not a merger.‖137 The legislative history of Cellar-
Kefauver reveals that Congress feared of ―what was considered to be a 
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy,‖138 and 
therefore gave courts ―authority for arresting mergers at a time when the 
trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its 
incipiency.‖139 
 
The efficiency of the relationship was seemingly irrelevant. 
 135.  Colom. Steel, 334 U.S. at 535–37.  
 136.  United States v. Phila. Nat‘l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 340 (1963). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962) (suggesting that ―some understood‖ Colom. Steel ―to 
indicate that existing law might be inadequate to prevent mergers that had substantially lessened 
competition in a section of the country, but which, nevertheless, had not risen to the level of those 
restraints of trade or monopoly prohibited by the Sherman Act‖). 
 137.  Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 341–42.  
 138.  Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315. 
 139.  Id. at 317. 
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The legislative history also suggested that one goal of antimerger law 
was to protect inefficient firms: ―[t]he possibility of lower costs was 
brushed aside in the legislative deliberations and there is every reason to 
believe that Congress preferred the noneconomic advantages of 
deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of operations.‖140 
In Brown Shoe, we can see the mischief of the incipiency notion taken to an 
extreme. The Court held unlawful a merger creating a firm with local 
market shares of as little as 5 percent141and vertical foreclosure of less than 
4 percent.142 It explicitly rested liability on the prospect that the merger 
would allow the surviving firm to achieve efficiencies: 
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers 
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing 
division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below 
those of competing independent retailers. Of course, some of the results 
of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their 
expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small 
independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize 
Congress‘ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated that 
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of 
fragmented industries and markets.143 
Similarly, in Von’s Grocery,144 the Court prevented the merger of 
grocery stores in a very fragmented market because the market was 
experiencing a trend toward concentration. ―Like the Sherman Act in 1890 
and the Clayton Act in 1914,‖ the Court wrote, ―the basic purpose of the 
1950 Cellar-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the 
American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in 
business.‖145 To condemn mergers of firms with small market shares that 
promised significant efficiencies oddly combined the ideological errors of 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Northern Securities—Harlan‘s view 
 
 140.  Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 226, 318 (1960).  
 141.  Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 343–44 (1962) (―In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the 
control of substantial shares of the trade in a city may have important effects on competition. If a 
merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger 
efforts by Brown‘s competitors seeking similar market shares.‖).  For a extensive discussion of the 
debate within the Supreme Court that led to the unanimous decision in Brown Shoe, see Tony A. 
Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 369-83.  
 142.  Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 327. 
 143.  Id. at 344. 
 144.  United States v. Von‘s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 145.  Id. at 275. 
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that virtually all horizontal mergers are unlawful and Holmes‘s view that 
mergers were only unlawful if they posed a threat to existing rivals. 
VI.  CORRECTING THE ERRORS OF U.S. STEEL (AND ITS POST-
NEW DEAL CRITICS): MODERN MONOPOLIZATION AND 
MERGER LAW 
Modern antitrust law has reached a new equilibrium that rejects both 
U.S. Steel and the misguided judicial responses to it in the decades after the 
New Deal. Monopoly achieved by internal expansion without the use of 
exclusionary practices is lawful,146 because it presumptively (even if not 
conclusively) suggests superior efficiency.147 The rewards of monopoly 
provide an incentive for firms to innovate and reduce costs.148 
Consequently, a firm that achieves monopoly power lawfully may exploit 
its power by reducing output and increasing prices.149 But it need not do so: 
even though modern courts still struggle to clarify the standard for unlawful 
maintenance of monopoly,150 the law has discarded Hand‘s suggestion that 
firms that acquire monopoly power lawfully monopolize by expanding 
output. It would be truly perverse to require firms with lawfully acquired 
monopoly power to limit output as U.S. Steel did. As Judge Posner has 
observed, ―[t]oday it is clear that a firm with lawful monopoly power has 
no general duty to help its competitors, whether by holding a price 
umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its competitive 
 
 146.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 178 (1978) 
(―Antitrust should not interfere with any firm size created by internal growth, and this is true whether 
the result is monopoly or oligopoly.‖). 
 147.  Although rare, a firm may violate Section 2 if it achieves monopoly power by unilateral 
exclusionary conduct. See generally Avishalom Tor, Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of 
Dominance or Monopoly Power, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 847 (2010). 
 148.  Verizon Commc‘ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(―The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‗business 
acumen‘ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To 
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful 
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.‖). 
 149.  See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 
1412–13 (7th Cir. 1995) (―A natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without 
excluding competitors by improper means is not guilty of ‗monopolizing‘ in violation of the Sherman 
Act … and can therefore charge any price that it wants …, for the antitrust laws are not a price-control 
statute or a public-utility or common-carrier rate-regulation statute.‖) (citations omitted). Different rules 
apply in other antitrust regimes. Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Excessive Pricing, Entry, 
Assessment,  and Investment: Lessons from the  Mittal  Litigation, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 873 
(2010); Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems 
of Belief About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343 (2004). 
 150.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253 
(203).  
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punches.‖151 Or as, the unanimous D.C. Circuit held in Microsoft, ―to be 
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist‘s act must . . . harm the 
competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one 
or more competitors will not suffice.‖152 Microsoft did not harm the 
competitive process, for example, by offering services free or improving its 
product, even where those actions harmed rivals.153 
A similar trajectory has occurred in merger law. Although Brown Shoe 
and Von’s have not been overruled, antitrust law has abandoned their view 
of the purpose of antimerger law. A merger will not be condemned because 
it generates efficiencies that are likely to reduce prices and thus harm 
rivals, even if the market is becoming more concentrated.154 The newly 
revised Merger Guidelines recognize that ―a primary benefit of mergers to 
the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus 
enhance the merged firm‘s ability and incentive to compete, which may 
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products.‖155 While antimerger law necessarily assumes that growth by 
merger is generally more likely to reduce competition than growth by 
internal expansion,156 it also recognizes that mergers may sometimes allow 
 
 151.  Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.1986). See 
also Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (observing 
that ―the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost 
structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical 
ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting‖); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, ¶51 (1980) (observing that ―the essence of the 
competitive process is to induce firms to become more efficient and to pass the benefits of the 
efficiency along to consumers‖ and that ―[t]hat process would be ill-served by using antitrust to block 
hard, aggressive competition that is solidly based on efficiencies and growth opportunities, even if 
monopoly is a possible result‖). 
 152.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 153.  Id. at 62 (upholding free services) & 75 (upholding development of a Windows-specific and 
somewhat faster version of the Java programming language).  
 154.  Judge Posner has observed, 
The most important developments that cast doubt on the continued vitality of such cases as 
Brown Shoe and Von’s are found in other cases, where the Supreme Court, echoed by the 
lower courts, has said repeatedly that the economic concept of competition, rather than any 
desire to preserve rivals as such, is the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application 
of the antitrust laws, not excluding the Clayton Act. . . . Applied to cases brought under 
section 7, this principle requires the [trier] to make a judgment whether the challenged 
acquisition is likely to hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the market to 
collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above the competitive 
level. 
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). 
 155.  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
10 (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines], http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.html#2b. 
 156.  United States v. Phila. Nat‘l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (―[S]urely one premise of an 
antimerger statute such as § 7 is that corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to 
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firms to achieve efficiencies that are not available by other means.157 
At the same time, the law does not excuse mergers like the one that 
created U.S. Steel simply because it did not achieve a complete monopoly 
or because the surviving firm did not engage in predatory conduct. Now, 
the law properly seeks to ―identify and challenge competitively harmful 
mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that are 
either competitively beneficial or neutral.‖ Mergers are competitively 
harmful if they ―create, enhance, or entrench market power or . . . facilitate 
its exercise.‖158 Anticompetitive effects may unilateral, if the merger 
allows the surviving company to act as dominant firm, or they may be 
coordinated, if the merger facilitates interdependent or collusive behavior 
among the surviving company and its rivals.159 
U.S. Steel provides a paradigm of how a merger can enhance or 
entrench market power under the Merger Guidelines. There were few 
complexities of market definition—the various products and which of the 
merging firms produced them were clear. Under the Gary dinner system, 
the rivals even sorted themselves into ―subcommittees‖ of competitors to 
coordinate prices in ―ore and pig iron, pipes and tubular goods, wire 
products, rails and billets (steel ingots), structural material, plates, steel 
bars, and sheets and tin plates.‖160 The concentration levels were far above 
the thresholds now considered dangerous. To take one example, before the 
merger, the market for steel rails was moderately concentrated, with a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of around 1800.161 Federal Steel and Carnegie 
 
growth by acquisition.‖). See also ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 199 (1979) (―[S]ize by internal growth demonstrates superior efficiency, but merger that creates 
real market control will certainly have the effect of restricting output and may or may not create new 
efficiencies.‖).  
 157.  Jamie Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent 
Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1722 (2010); Alan Devlin & Bruno Peixoto, 
Reformulating Antitrust Rules to Safeguard Societal Wealth, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 225, 245–46 
(2007); William J. Kolaski & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 245 (2003). 
 158. Merger Guidelines, supra note 146 at 1. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Page, Gary Dinners, supra note 6, at 603. 
 161.  The following figures for sales of steel rails (by volume) between September 21, 1900 and 
March 25, 1901, are drawn from Brief of Appellant, filed Oct. 7, 1916, at 95, United States v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920)TABLE. Sales of Steel Rails from Sept. 21, 1900 to Mar. 25, 1901 
Types of Steel Rails  Sales (tons) Share (%) 
Federal Steel 467,185 27 
Carnegie Steel 430,307 25 
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Steel each sold roughly a quarter of the market‘s volume while National 
and four other firms sold roughly equal shares of the remainder. After the 
merger combined the shares of Federal, Carnegie, and National, U.S. Steel 
accounted for over 60 percent of the market‘s volume and post-merger HHI 
was over 4000—an increase of over 2000 points. Under modern standards, 
in highly concentrated markets, an increase in concentration one tenth as 
great would raise competitive concerns.162 
If we consider the consummated merger, there was evidence of both 
unilateral and coordinated maintenance of noncompetitive prices in 
numerous product lines. During the 1890s, while pooling arrangements 
were in effect, the price of steel rails was around $26 per ton. In 1897 and 
1898, the pools fell apart and the price dropped to between $16 and $18 per 
ton.163 These price wars led to the formation of Federal Steel and other 
efforts at cooperation and, eventually, consolidation. After the formation of 
U.S. Steel, standard Bessemer steel rails sold for $28 in domestic markets 
for 15 years, with open-hearth rails selling for slightly more, depending 
upon their alloy content.164 The district court found that this persistent 
standard pricing was not collusive, because ―rail manufacturers simply 
followed that basic price to prevent the ruinous rail wars of the past.‖165 As 
Charles M. Schwab, a former president of U.S. Steel, put it, ―if I were to 
vary that price of $28 for rails, which seems to have been recognized by all 
rail manufacturers as a fair price and giving a fair profit, if I were to vary 
that 10 cents a ton, I would precipitate a steel war . . . that would result in 
ruining my works without any profit. Everybody by tacit and mutual 
understanding felt the same about that.‖166 
The court correctly determined that this behavior did not amount to 
price fixing. Under modern analysis, however, tacit coordination would 
 
National Steel 166,302 10 
Lackawanna Steel 206,597 12 
Pennsylvania Steel 189,014 11 
Cambria Steel 163,799 9 
Colorado Fuel & Iron 108,390 6 
Total 1,731,594 100 
 
 162.  Merger Guidelines, supra note155, at 5.3.  
 163.  Brief of Appellant, filed Oct. 7, 1916 at 93, U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. 417.   
 164.  United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 154 (D.N.J. 1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920).  
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. (quoting Schwab‘s testimony at a tariff hearing in 1908 which was read into the record of 
the monopolization caseTranscript of Record, at 4387, volume 11.) 
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still be grounds for invalidating the merger that made it possible. As the 
Merger Guidelines put it, ―a merger may diminish competition by enabling 
or encouraging post-merger coordinated interaction among firms in the 
relevant market that harms customers.‖167 This sort of interaction can 
involve parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior 
understanding. Parallel accommodating conduct includes situations in 
which each rival‘s response to competitive moves made by others is 
individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor 
intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless 
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce 
prices or offer customers better terms. Coordinated interaction includes 
conduct not otherwise condemned by the antitrust laws.168 
Given the prevalence of price wars and cartel activity before the 
merger, it seems clear that the merger enabled or encouraged coordinated 
pricing, as the promoters anticipated. As further evidence of jointly 
exercised monopoly power, U.S. Steel consistently sold steel rails in export 
markets for more than $6 less per ton than in domestic markets.169 And, of 
course, in other product lines, U.S. Steel coordinated illegal collusive 
pricing through the Gary dinners system. 
A merger might be justified under the guidelines by merger-specific 
efficiencies, those that are ―likely to be accomplished with the proposed 
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the 
proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive 
effects.‖170 The evidence does not support the suggestion that the U.S. Steel 
merger achieved efficiencies unavailable to smaller firms—certainly not 
sufficient efficiencies to outweigh the monopoly power that the merger 
created.171 The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the merger was to 
achieve monopoly power, not economies of scale or other efficiencies. 
Both Federal Steel and Carnegie Steel were well integrated backward into 
iron ore production before the consolidation.172 U.S. Steel‘s efforts at 
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rationalizing production were limited173 and would likely have occurred 
even without the consolidation.174 It did not establish a central research 
laboratory until 1928.175 Its greatest achievement was the ―belated‖ 
construction in 1911 of ―the world‘s largest and most efficient steel-
producing works‖ in Gary, Indiana.176 What efficiencies it achieved, 
moreover, did not benefit its customers because of Judge Gary‘s pricing 
policies.177 
Recently, Keith Hylton and Haizhen Lin have argued that mergers 
toward monopoly should be viewed more favorably when they are 
accompanied by innovation.178 They observe that some markets like 
banking and airlines may be too fragmented to allow firms to invest in 
necessary productive facilities and product improvements. They continue: 
When profit serves as a signal for investment, mergers for the sole 
purpose of gaining pricing power cannot be regarded as presumptively 
socially undesirable. If too much pricing power is attained, entry will 
occur, pushing prices back down. The ordinary process of entry and exit 
will regulate profits to a level sufficient to compensate investments in 
market expanding products and services. 
On a more general level, there is an open question about the fit between 
merger policy and general antitrust doctrine under Section 2. Given 
monopolization law‘s distinction between exploitation and exclusion, the 
policy against mergers for market power seems difficult to explain. 
Mergers toward monopoly are efforts to exploit market power. They 
sometimes include a risk of exclusion in the future, but it is by no means 
clear that a merger should be prohibited simply because of a risk that the 
merged entity may later exclude rivals. Let the law operate on the 
merged entity at the moment it attempts to exclude a rival.179 
This argument echoes the majority opinion in U.S. Steel by suggesting 
that mergers toward monopoly unaccompanied by exclusion are often 
benign and sometimes necessary to gain the size necessary for adequate 
investment. Government intervention, in this view, is unwarranted because 
 
 173.  McCraw & Reinhardt, supra note 60, at 595–96 (noting U.S Steel ―saddled itself with a 
locational inertia that minimized its ability to exploit new opportunities in growing geographical 
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 174.  CHANDLER, supra note 52, at 133. 
 175.  Id. at 139. 
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 179.  Id. at 269. 
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entry will regulate excessive pricing by eroding the dominant firm‘s market 
share. But U.S. Steel suggests that, even without exclusion, unilateral and 
coordinated exercises of monopoly power can persist for decades.180 
It is true that, under section 2, firms with monopoly power acquired 
lawfully by internal expansion—in other words, by producing products that 
consumers want more than others—can legitimately exploit that power by 
charging what the market will bear. As Justice Day wrote in his dissent in 
U.S. Steel, ―the act offers no objection to the mere size of a corporation, nor 
to the continued exertion of its lawful power, when that size and power 
have been obtained by lawful means and developed by natural growth.‖181 
But a merger that creates substantial monopoly power that allows firms to 
engage in monopoly pricing should be unlawful. Mergers toward monopoly 
do not simply exploit monopoly power; they create it by means that do not 
necessarily or even probably benefit consumers. There is ample reason for 
a policy aimed at blocking (or dissolving) mergers that allow firms to 
acquire monopoly power, absent convincing evidence that the merger 
provides consumer benefits that are unavailable by other means. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice White emphasized Standard Oil‘s predatory conduct as 
evidence that the merger creating the firm was monopolistic. Justice 
McKenna drew the lesson that U.S. Steel‘s eschewal of predatory conduct 
was evidence that the merger creating the firm was benign in effect if not in 
intent. We can now see that McKenna, lacking a theoretical framework, 
and misled by a very different narrative in Standard Oil, drew the wrong 
economic conclusions from the available evidence. The merger creating 
U.S. Steel was perhaps the most monopolistic in American history. That 
economic error led McKenna to the wrong result: U.S. Steel should have 
been dissolved. 
But it would be wrong to conclude that, because predation should not 
have been required to establish liability in U.S. Steel, it should never be 
required. Alcoa, for example, mistakenly held that a firm that acquired 
monopoly power lawfully could violate Section 2 by expanding output to 
meet new demand. That holding seemed to suggest, perversely, that U.S. 
Steel‘s strategy of maintaining high prices and ceding market share to 
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rivals was the only way a monopolist could avoid liability. The same sort 
of thinking tended to support the equally perverse position, reflected in 
cases like Brown Shoe and Von’s that a merger that created no monopoly 
power could be unlawful if it allowed the surviving firm to lower cost and 
expand output. 
Modern antitrust law has corrected both the wrong turns of the post-
New Deal era and U.S. Steel itself. Firms that gain monopoly power 
lawfully transgress Section 2 only by using exclusionary conduct to 
maintain their monopoly power—that is, by actions that harm rivals and 
consumers. They may exploit their power by restricting output and raising 
prices to consumers, because that is the reward for achieving monopoly 
power by internal expansion; they may also expand output and lower prices 
to consumers, even if doing so harms rivals. Similarly, mergers that create 
no monopoly power and lower costs should be lawful even if they harm 
rivals. The correct lesson of U.S. Steel is that mergers that create monopoly 
power should be unlawful regardless of whether the surviving firm engages 
in predatory conduct. Modern antitrust law has learned this lesson. Under 
the Merger Guidelines, a merger is unlawful essentially if the surviving 
firm is likely to behave like U.S. Steel—maintaining noncompetitive prices 
unilaterally or collusively. 
 
